Abstract. We analyse the security regarding timing attacks of implementations of the decryption in McEliece PKC with binary Goppa codes. First, we review and extend the existing attacks, both on the messages and on the keys. We show that, until now, no satisfactory countermeasure could erase all the timing leakages in the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) step. Then, we describe a version of the EEA never used for McEliece so far. It uses a constant number of operations for given public parameters. In particular, the operation flow does not depend on the input of the decryption, and thus closes all previous timing attacks. We end up with what should become a central tool toward a secure implementation of McEliece decryption.
Introduction
Context of this work. Code-based cryptography relies on the hardness of decoding, that is recovering m and e when given only c = mG + e and G (for m ∈ F k q , G ∈ F k×n q and e ∈ F n q ). Indeed, decoding was proved to be exponentially difficult in the Hamming weight of e when no structure is known on G in [2] . However, the error weight is critical for security for another reason: contrary to the public parameters of the code which are fixed at set by an external entity, the error may vary at each encryption, and may even be chosen by any public user (in some situations).
Therefore, a problem arises in most of the implementations of McEliece proposed (e.g. in [5, 6, 14, 13] ) because the operation flow of the decryption is strongly influenced by the error vector, but no information is known about the error vector when starting decryption. From an attacker's point of view, this is a favorable situation. It means that the observed or manipulated device may leak information before any detection of the attack. These security aspects were addressed by various authors, who explained that a device implementing an unprotected decryption is prone to attacks on the messages [12, 1] and on the key [15, 16] . Although countermeasures were proposed against some of the leakages, the situation is still unsatisfactory, as it is noticed in the conclusion of [16] . In particular, to the best of our knowledge, no decryption algorithm requiring a number of steps independent of the error weight was described. The work of Bernstein et al. in [4] claims to achieve this goal, but some steps of the decryption (including the extended Euclidean algorithm (EEA) in the decoding) are skipped in the description, and no implementation is publicly available.
Our contributions. First, we gather the different weaknesses revealed in [12, 1, 15, 16] . In particular, we detail the attacks of Strenzke and show that they can be extended to bypass the countermeasure of [15] . All these attacks targeted only one of the two known methods for decoding a binary Goppa code (namely Patterson algorithm). Along with our presentation, we evaluate how/if those threats transpose to the other decoding method (ie the alternant decoder). Our central contribution consists in describing an EEA tailored for the alternant decoder which has a flow of operations independent of the error vectors (Alg. 10). It was inspired by a work of Berlekamp [3] . We explain step-by-step the construction of the algorithm, and provide completeness proofs (which we could not find in the literature).
McEliece Public-Key Encryption
We recall in Alg. 1 the encryption and decryption in McElice PKC instantiated with a binary Goppa code, that is q = 2. The public key is G a k × n matrix over F q whose rows generate a Goppa code described by the secret elements x ∈ F n q m and g(z) ∈ F q m [z] of degree t.
Algorithm 1 McEliece Cryptosystem
Parameters : Field size q, code length n and dimension k, parameters m, t such that n − mt 0. Plaintext space: F k q . Ciphertext space: F n q . KeyGen : Pick a support x ∈ F n q m , a polynomial g ∈ Fqm [x] of degree t, G a generator matrix of G (x, g). Public key : G pub = SGP, t the correction capacity of the code G (x, g). Private key : Tt a t-decoder for G (x, g) , S a random full rank (n − k) × (n − k) matrix , P a random n × n permutation matrix.
Encrypt :
1: Input m ∈ F k q . 2: Generate random e ∈ F n q with wH (e) = t. 3: Output c = mG pub + e.
Decrypt :
1: Input c ∈ F , else output ⊥. Now we detail the possible decoders T t for a binary Goppa code. Suppose one wants to decode an encoded message m ∈ F k q with errors e: c = mG + e, where the Hamming weight of e (denoted in the rest of this article by w H (e)) satisfies w H (e) t. We write e = (. . . , 0, e i1 , 0, . . . , 0, e iw , 0, . . . ). Two methods exist for decoding. The one uses the fact that Goppa codes belong to the larger class of alternant codes, so we refer to this method as the Alternant Decoder. The other one, called Patterson Algorithm, is specific to binary Goppa codes. For both, the main steps are :
1. Compute the polynomial syndrome S(z), a univariate polynomial deduced from c, but depending only on e. 2. Solve the key equation, which is an equation whose unkowns are univariate polynomials, using an EEA. The solutions give access to the error locator polynomial σ e (z), whose roots are related to the support elements x ij in the error positions i j . It also the yields the error evaluator polynomial ω e (z) (helpful to find the values of the errors). 3. Find the roots of σ e (z). Here e ∈ F n 2 , so e ij = 0 implies that e ij = 1.
The polynomial syndromes, key equations and their resolutions are specific to each method. We briefly sum them up.
Polynomial syndrome
Polynomial syndrome
. Polynomials to be recovered Polynomials to be recovered
Key equation
Key equation (σ inv,e , ω inv,e ) unique solution of (σ 1 , σ 2 ) unique solution of
Gop,e mod g), 2.EEA(g(z), τ, t/2 ) outputs (σ 1 , σ 2 ).
Error recovery
Error recovery
ω e = σ e S e mod g. Find the roots of σ e . Completeness proofs are classic coding theory literature. For details, see for instance [7] [Ch. 12 §9] for the Alternant Decoder and [18, 9] for Patterson Algorithm.
The extended Euclidean Algorithm which is used in all the available implementations (see [5, 6, 14, 13] ) consists in successive Euclidean divisions as in Alg. 2. Its complexity is in O(deg(a)
2 ) field multiplications. It is to be noticed that asymptotically better algorithms exist, generally referred to as Fast EEA or HGCD (for Half-GCD), with complexity O(deg(a) log deg(a)). The reason not to use them here is that constants are hidden in the O (see for details [19] ). Consequently, for the degrees at stake in McEliece decryption ( 200), those are not more efficient than Alg. 2.
Algorithm 2 Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA)
For the EEA executions solving the key equations (EEA in Alternant decoder, second EEA in Patterson algorithm), the paragraph §5 of [18] gives refined complexities of respectively 7.5tw H (e) and 3.5tw H (e). For the syndrome polynomial inversion in the Patterson decoding (first EEA), a quick analysis shows that, the number of field multiplications is bounded by 2t 2 . We obtain with an error vector of weight t a cost in field multiplications of 7.5t 2 for the Alternant decoder and 5.5t 2 for Patterson algorithm. This is why Patterson algorithm is generally preferred.
Decryption oracle attacks
The attacker hass a ciphertext c. He also has access to a decryption oracle. He can request decryption of any message c = c and observe the execution of the decryption.
Plaintext-recovery attacks
In [12, 1, 15] , the authors described attacks using the same framework. They exploit a decryption oracle to recover the plaintext from an encrypted message c. Those focus only on Patterson method for decoding (Fig. 2) . Here, we apply the different attacks proposed to both decoding algorithms in order to determine which one is the most resistant.
Generic attack scenario. The common framework is summed up in Alg. 3.
Algorithm 3
Framework for message-recovery attacks on a decryption device.
Input: A valid ciphertext c = mG pub + e, a decryption device D. Output: The error vector e and plaintext m.
Modify c into c
Deduce by timing analysis or power consumption of D whether ei = 0 or ei = 1. 5: end for 6: Solve the linear system with unknown m: mG pub = c + e. 7: return Plaintext m.
Alg. 3 describes an attack against a McEliece encryption scheme. The same framework is applicable against Niederreiter encryption when a public encryption key H pub is known. It suffices to replace Step 2 by
pub denotes the i-th row of H pub .
In CCA2 conversions, a condition is imposed to the error. Ciphertext manipulation is detected thanks to a test on the validity of the error and the algorithm outputs a failure: the attacker only checking the output does not recover information except that the ciphertext was not valid.
Historically, the first method was explained in [17] and refined in [1] . It dates back to 2008 and focuses on the determination of the roots of the error locator polynomial σ e (z) (Figure 2 ). The authors of [1] and [17] propose convicing countermeasures against this weakness (see [1] [Alg. 4]). Indeed, when starting the root-finding step, errors of weight lower than t can be detected thanks to the low degree of the error locator polynomial. This makes this step rather simple to protect. Unfortunately, this is not sufficient to discard attacks following the framework of Alg. 3. The reason is that, as first noticed in [12] , the EEA determining σ e also has an execution time depending on the error weight. Now we will focus on the EEA step which is still problematic.
Exploitation of EEA leakages The authors of [12] focused on Patterson algorithm (Fig. 2) . In the second EEA, implemented as in Alg. 2, the number of iterations in the while loop depends on the weight of the error. To do so, they show that the output σ 1 (z), σ 2 (z) satisfy the relations:
Thanks to relations (1) and (2), they deduce that, assuming that all the Euclidean divisions in the second EEA have a quotient of degree one (which happens with probability (1−2 −m ) N ), the number N of iterations in the while loop varies as in Table 1 . These variations of N can be detected either by measuring time execution or counting the number of patterns on a power consumption trace. Thus, they provide a successful tool to perform Alg. 3 and recover a plaintext.
Countermeasure. To protect against the previous attack, the authors of [12] propose to check the degrees of the polynomials processed by the EEA during its execution instead of checking only the output. We recall that, in Patterson's decoding, the error locator polynomial is split into even and odd part:
gives a precise description of the degrees to be expected for σ 1 (z) and σ 2 (z) according to the weight of the error, recalled in Table 1 . 
They deduce Alg. 4, a modified EEA which detects the ciphertext manipulation and completes the computation to take same execution time both on the ciphertext c and on the twisted c i . With this version, the authors claim to obtain a decryption time taking a constant number of clock cycles. This would discard a timing attack. However, no power consumption trace is analyzed. It remains unclear whether the extra manipulation in Step 9 of Alg. 4, whose execution implies that e i = 1, is undetectable. In particular, each while iteration will not have the same execution time. Fakely executing those steps at each iteration would have a serious impact on the performances.
EEA leakages in the Alternant Decoder. We adapt the framework of Alg. 3 to the alternant decoder. The alternant decoder, as Patterson one, resorts to an EEA
Algorithm 4 Protected EEA for Patterson decoding
Beginning as is Alg. 2.
7:
Manipulate ri so that deg(ri) = deg(ri−1) − 1. 10: end if
Manipulate ri so that deg(ri) = deg(ri−1) − 1. 10: end if End as is Alg. 2.
( Fig. 1) prone to leak information when the error weight varies. The equivalent of Relations (1) and (2) in this context is
Looking at the degree of the output polynomial of the EEA in Alg. 1, we have the following link with the weight of the error vector (α denotes the position of the support such that x α = 0): The error locator polynomial is deduced from σ inv (z) when the weight of the error vector is known. Indeed, when 0 is a possible error position, one cannot determine with certainty the degree of σ e (z) from the degree of its reciprocal polynomial σ inv (z). The reason is that for any polynomial p(z) ∈ F q [z], p(z) and zp(z) have same reciprocal polynomial. After computing a polynomial σ inv (z) of degree d, if 0 belongs to the support, there are two possibilities, either the index α such that x α = 0 is not an error position, σ e is not divisible by z, then deg(σ e ) = deg(σ inv ) and σ e (z) is equal to
, or α is an error position, and σ e (z) = z deg(σinv)+1 σ inv (z −1 ). Therefore, in this case, looking at the degree of σ inv does not distinguish manipulated ciphertexts from correct ones, and the EEA cannot be correctly protected by this method.
Countermeasure. Building up on the countermeasure for Patterson decoding described in [12] , we propose the following adaptation (Alg. 5) to the alternant decoder. It always detects ciphertext manipulation provided that 0 is not an element of the support, and somehow restores a usual behavior of the EEA (that is, that of a valid ciphertext). The final output will not be the correct plaintext, but this is not a problem as long as the attacker cannot extract information from this result. However, we note that this protection has the same drawbacks as its Patterson equivalent: each while execution does not have same execution time.
Algorithm 5 Protected EEA for Alternant decoder
Manipulate ri so that deg(ri) = deg(ri−1) − 1 10: end if End as is Alg. 2.
Secret decryption key recovery attacks
We address a different kind of physical attack initiated by Strenzke in [15, 16] against McEliece encryption using Patterson decoding. It aims at recovering the secret key.
Generic attack scenario. The attack scenario is the following. The attacker has acces to a decryption device D on which he can perform physical measurements. He also knows a public encryption key, so that he can generate codewords with errors of his choice. By observing the decryption phase (more precisely, the EEA execution), Strenzke shows that one can deduce information on the support elements corresponding to the error positions. Roughly, the reason is that when a polynomial condition on those elements is satisfied, the number of iterations of the while loop in Alg. 2 is reduced compared to the average number of iterations necessary to perform the EEA for error vectors of same weight. The attack consists in scanning a lot of error positions and collect sufficiently many polynomial relations so that the algebraic system obtained can be solved.
We sum up in Alg. 6 the global attack framework arising from [16] . The polynomials P w will be elementary symmetric polynomials of the form, for an error e = (0, . . . , e i1 , . . . , e iw , . . . , 0) with w H (e) = w and j 0:
That is, ω j (e) is the evaluation of the j th elementary symmetric polynomial in w variables in (x i1 , . . . , x iw ).
Algorithm 6 Framework for key-recovery attacks on a decryption device.
Input: A decryption device D, public encryption key G pub . Output: The secret support x.
1: for w well-chosen error weights do 2:
for (i1, . . . , iw) subset of {0, . . . , n − 1} do 3:
Pick a low-weight error vector e = (0, . . . , ei 1 , . . . , ei w , . . . , 0) with wH (e) = w.
4:
Request decryption D(e).
5:
Perform timing or power consumption analysis of D(e).
6:
if EEA execution is faster than average (more precise conditions in this Section) then 7:
Deduce a polynomial condition on xi 1 , . . . , xi w (Pw is a polynomial depending only on w):
8:
end for 10: end for 11: Solve the non-linear system of all the collected equations (4). 12: return Secret support x = (x0, . . . , xn−1).
State-of-the-art. More precisely, Strenzke uses errors of weights w = 1, w = 4 and w = 6. For w = 6, errors such that Eq. (4) is satisfied are harder to find than for w = 4. For this reason, his strategy consists in collecting as many Eq. (4) with w = 1 and w = 4 as possible. He obtains a linear system of rank n − m (in some cases n − m − 1) in the n elements of the support. Then, he selects subsets of errors of weight w = 6 to look for Eq. (4). These subsets are chosen so as help the polynomial system solving. According to Strenzke, for an encryption scheme with parameters m = 10, n = 2 m , t = 40, it takes about 15,000,000 decryption queries to collect enough equations and 28 hours to solve the algebraic system. Eventually, the full secret support x is recovered by the attacker, and then the Goppa polynomial is easy to find. Indeed, it is well explained in [8] [p. 125] how, given the public key, it is possible to recover one from the other in polynomial time.
First example of leakage exploitable by Framework 6. The first attack resorting to the method of Alg. 6 was proposed by Strenzke in [15] . It focuses on the second EEA of Patterson alg. with errors of weight w = 4. In this case, S e (z) = 4 j=1
σe(z) , and
ω3(e)
.
If ω 1 (e) = 0, then S e (z) = ω3(e) σe(z) , and S −1 e mod g = ω 3 (e) −1 σ e (z) therefore
e (z) + z mod g(z) = ω 3 (e) −1 σ e (z) + z and τ (z) has degree lower than t/2 (for w = 4 we have deg(τ (z)) = 2). As a consequence, the while test in EEA(g(z), τ (z), t/2 ) is never fulfilled and the number of iterations N is equal to 0. When ω 1 (e) = 0, deg(τ (z)) > t/2 with overwhelming probability (τ (z) is a reduction modulo a polynomial of degree t), so that N > 0. This allows to collect many equations of the form
As Strenzke explains, the final system's rank never exceeds n−m. So it is not sufficient in practice to recover the private key and one has to assume that some other parts of private elements are required. Still, he proposes a counter-measure to avoid this information leakage.
Countermeasure to protect Second EEA by Strenzke. Strenzke proposes to detect the polynomials τ (z) leading to this leakage by checking if deg(τ (z)) < t/2 . This can be done just after the determination of τ (z). If so, manipulate τ (z) so that is has degree t − 1. This countermeasure avoids leaking information only in the second EEA, only when decoding errors of weight 4. Exploitable leakages remain, as shown in the next paragraph.
Leakage in the first EEA of Patterson Decoding. In order to complete the attack initiated in [15] , Strenzke proposed in [16] to apply Alg. 6 by focusing on time leakages in both EEA's of Patterson decoding. In [16] [Corollary 1], he gives the number of iterations of the while loop in the first EEA. We recall it here, and complete it with the analogous result for the second EEA (which we could not find in [16] ). g(z) ) be a binary Goppa code and S e (z) the polynomial syndrome associated to an error e with w H (e) deg(g)/2 − 1. Write S e (z) = ωe(z) σe(z) mod g(z). Let N I and N K be the number of iterations of the while loop respectively in EEA(g(z), S e (z), 0) and EEA(g(z), τ (z), t/2 ). Then
Proof. The result on N I is proved in [16] [Corollary 1]. Regarding N K , observe that v 0 has degree 0 and v N K = σ 2 (z) has degree deg(ω e )/2 (since by derivating the relation σ = σ
we obtain ω e = σ 2 2 ). As the degrees are raised at least by one at each iteration, we obtain N K deg(ω e )/2.
Let's apply this small weight error vectors. Note that, for any error e, deg(σ e ) = w H (e).
For an error weight w = 4. Pick e = (0, . . . , e i1 , . . . , e i4 , . . . , 0). We know that ω e (z) = ω 1 (e)z 2 + ω 3 (e). Lemma 1 gives the number N I of iterations in EEA(g(z), S e (z), 0) satisfies
Therefore, even if the second EEA has been protected with Strenzke's countermeasure, errors of weight w = 4 leak the same information in the first EEA. This does not give enough equations. To complete the algebraic system, the idea is to use error weights w = 6.
For an error weight w = 6. For e = (0, . . . , e i1 , . . . , e i6 , . . . , 0), we develop S Gop,e (z) :
Strenzke's purpose is to detect for which e is holds that ω 3 (e) = ω 1 (e) = 0. These cases are exactly those with S e (z) −1 = ω 5 (e) −1 σ e (z) and hence deg(τ (z)) < t/2 , so that the number of iterations in the second EEA is 0 provided that Strenzke's counter-measure is not applied. This is a somehow surprising proposition, since this criterion can be rendered useless by a counter-measure already proposed by the same author.
Combination of first and second EEA. When using error weights w 6, the attacker will encounter problems due to the fact that all the values given in 3 are only bounds (except in the cases N 0). Indeed, it may happen that one of the Euclidean divisions entails a degree fall greater than 1 independantly of
wH (e) = 4 ω1(e) = 0 NI 6 NK 1 ω1(e) = 0 NI 4
ω1(e) = 0,ω3(e) = 0 NI 10 NK 2 ω1(e) = 0,ω3(e) = 0 NI 8 NK 1 ω1(e) = 0,ω3(e) = 0
wH (e) = 2w
ω1(e) = 0,ω3(e) = 0 NI 4w − 2 NK w − 1 ω1(e) = 0,ω3(e) = 0 NI 4w − 4 NK w − 2 ω1(e) = 0,ω3(e) = 0 NI 4w − 6 NK w − 3 Table 3 : Overview of small-error-weight message attacks. Cases marked with a * or a + are proposed resp. in [15] and [16] .
the degree of ω e . For example, with w = 6, the attacker may observe N K = 1 whereas ω 1 (e) is not zero. This remark leads Strenzke to discard those cases for an attack as long as no way of distinguishing thoses cases is found. We propose such distinguisher, by using N I to determine if ω 1 (e) is zero, as ω 1 (e) = 0 implies N I 8. Indeed, an attacker observing the errors e with (N I , N K ) = (10, 1) can conclude that ω 1 (e) = 0 (cf Table 3 ). We may have (N I , N K ) = (8, 1) when ω 1 (e) = 0 if three cancellations occur in the 12 intermediate polynomials, which has probability p 3 =
for m = 10 (we model the leading coefficients as random elements of F 2 m ). When sampling x error vectors, we expect to find p 3 x such misleading cases. With the numbers of samples from [16] [ Table 2 ], the probability to find one is not negligible. If at least one wrong equation is deduced, the system to solve has no solution and the attack fails. We propose to avoid this problem by using errors with w 8.
Example w = 8. We sampled randomly 10,000,000 errors e of weight 8 and collected the couples (N I , N K ) in Table 4 . When w H (e) = 8, there are more possibilities than with w = 6. Samples with (N I 12, N K 2) do not necessarily have ω 1 (e) = 0: this happens with probability p 3 = 17 3 2 −3m (1 − 2 −m ) 14 ≈ 6.10 −7 for m = 10 (we found 3). In particular, the case marked with a * in Table 4 would make the attacker to think erroneously that the corresponding error vector satisfies ω 1 (e) = 0. However, the number of parasitic cancellations necessary to provide values (N I , N K ) compatible with (ω 1 (e), ω 3 (e)) = (0, 0) is 6, which happens with probability p 3 = 17 6 2 −6m (1 − 2 −m ) 11 ≈ 10 −14 for m = 10. If ω 1 (e) = 0 but ω 3 (e) = 0, then a couple (10, 1) is found if 3 cancellations occur. This has probability 2 −m p 3 ≈ 6.10 −10 (as ω 1 takes all the values of F 2 m with same probability). Therefore, we are able to say without ambiguity when (ω 1 (e), ω 3 (e)) = (0, 0) on a considerable amount of samples. We deduce from our samples 10 equations ω 1 (e) = 0 which are correct with proba. (1 − 10 −7 ) and 10 equations ω 3 (e) = 0 correct with proba. (1 − 10 −3 ). To conclude, although our method requires more samples than the previous one (around 10 9 to collect some thousands equations with ω 1 , and dozens with ω 3 ), we showed that it is possible to recover information on the support even if the countermeasure deg(τ ) < t/2 is implemented.
Small weight error messages in Alternant decoder
We determine if an attacker can retrieve any information by applying Alg. 6 if the Alternant decoder is implemented. Lemma 2, which is analogous to Lemma 1, analyses the impact of small weight error messages on the EEA. Error weights w > 1. We suppose that no error occurred in the zero element of the support so that deg(σ inv ) = w H (e) always holds (the coefficient of z w in σ inv is x i1 . . . x iw ). Therefore, faster decryptions indicate the cancellation of a leading coefficient in the intermediate values, but in the alternant decoder we found no way of determining which intermediate value was concerned. If by any chance a power analysis can ensure that it is the first intermediate polynomial (that is, the syndrome polynomial S Alt,e (z)) that has a degree smaller than expected, then the information recovered would be:
We observe that the equations written thanks to this method are more complex than with Patterson algorithm, at least for two reasons. First, they are not directly polynomial, and the degrees implied are much higher. Second, as both x and g have to be unknown ( [8] [p. 125]), additive unknowns are necessary: either t + 1 to describe the secret polynomial's coefficients, or n if we introduce new equations y i = g(x i ) −2 . We conclude that the alternant decoder is intrinsically more resistant to Strenzke's attacks. However, the overall security is still not clear due to the uncertainty on the countermeasure (described in Alg. 5) against Alg. 3.
Extended euclidean Algorithm with constant flow
We expose a way of implementing the EEA algorithm unused so far for McEliece decryption. It has the very interesting property of requiring a number of operations depending only on the Goppa polynomial degree t and not on the weight of the error introduced in the ciphertext. Therefore, the attacks of 3.1 and 3.2 are not possible.
It is inspired by Berlekamp's work in [3] (which as followed by other works of optimization in the VLSI community, amongst many others [10, 11] ). We could find no reference to it in any paper related to McEliece. On the contrary, designing such an algorithm is desirable goal according to the conclusion of [16] . The reason may be that [3] has a very limited access, and we could find no completeness proofs of the algorithm proposed. Here, we transform smoothly the original EEA (Alg. 2) into successive version gaining in regularity (Algorithms 8 and 9). We end up with Alg. 10, which is simpler and more regular than all the previous ones. At each step, we give and prove (in Appendix) the form of the outputs and intermediate values. Finally, each execution of Alg. 10 costs, in field multiplications, exactly 16t 2 (2t times a loop costing 4 × 2t). In the rest of this article we will set N be the number of Euclidean divisions performed during EEA(z 2t , S Alt (z), t) in Alg. 2, d i = deg(r i (z)), and
For any polynomial P (z) ∈ F q m [z], we denote its coefficients by P j even for j > deg(P ) (in which case P j = 0), so that
Regarding the δ i 's, we prove the following result which will be very useful to design an algorithm with regular pattern:
Lemma 3. Let the δ i 's be defined as previously during the execution of EEA(z 2t , S e (z), t), then it holds that
We propose several intermediate versions of algorithms computing σ inv,e (z).
Unrolling Euclidean divisions In Alg. 8, we decompose each Euclidean division into a number of polynomial subtractions depending only on δ i the degrees of the quotients. We explicit the intermediate values of the Euclidean division of R i−2 (z) by R i−1 (z), that we denote by R (0)
To do so, we eliminate in each R (j) i (z) (for 0 j δ i + 1) the term z di−2−j , whether the associated coefficient is zero or not. This is why we perform the Euclidean divisions in a way to avoid the divisions by a field elements (Steps 7 to 11 of Alg. 8). Consequently, the outputs are multiple of the outputs of Alg. 2 with the same inputs. 
There are two problems with Alg. 8: the first one is that the inner for loop ((Steps 7 to 11) has a variable length, and contains a multiplication z δi−(j−1) R i (z) which depends on the iteration, which will produce a recognizable pattern and the second problem is that the while loop leads to a variable number of operations according to the input. Alg. 9 is a first step towards the resolution of the second problem. It is not realistic (it requires that Alg. 8 has already been executed and observed), but it eases the proofs of completeness of Alg. 10, which solves both issues.
Regular polynomial shift pattern. In Alg. 9, we perform the Euclidean division in such a way that we only multiply the operand by z at each for iteration. This can be done by splitting in two phases each Euclidean divisions. The first phase (Steps 4 to 7) "re-aligns" the operandsR i−2 andR i−1 so that they both have same degree d = deg(R −1 (z))(= 2t). Doing so, the second phase (Steps 8 to 12) compute the polynomial subtractions (corresponding to Steps 9-10 of Alg. 8) and perform a shift "re-aligning" the operands. A consequence is that the polynomialsR i (z) are of the form z ki R i (z) and the degrees d i are lost. This problem will be solved in Alg. 10.
Proposition 2 (Comparison of Algorithms 8 and 9)
. For each i = 1, . . . , N , after Step 13 of Alg. 9, it holds that
Algorithm 8 EEA with unrolled Euclidean Division
Input: a(z) = z 2t , b(z) = Se(z). Output: U (z) = λN σe(z), R(z) = λN ωe(z) (for some λN ∈ F * q m ).
βi ← LC(Ri−1(z)).
7:
for j = 0, . . . , ∆i do 8:
end for 12:
i−2 here) . . . Algorithm 9 Toy EEA with regular shift pattern
end for 8:
for j = 0, . . . , ∆i do 9:αi,j ←R
end for 13:Ri(z) ←R
i−2 here) . . . 
Complete Regular Flow EEA. To design a real constant flow algorithm, we merge the loops L 1 and L 2 in a common pattern so as to be indistinguishable (Steps 5 to 7 of Alg.10). They differenciate by the assignements which are performed in Steps 14-15 and 18-19. To know when polynomials substractions have to be stopped, we collect in a counter δ the number of shifts necessary to re-align the operands. Finally, when the polynomials σ inv and ω inv have been computed, the extra executions of the main loop (Steps 4 to 22) consist in shifting the operands. therefore, the number of iterations can be safely set to the maximum value (ie 2t to decode the errors with w H (e) = t)), and the while loop is replaced by for.
Proposition 3 (Comparison of Algorithms 8 and 10.). For each i = 1, . . . , N , after steps 21, it holds that:
The outputs of Alg. 10 are, for some µ ∈ F * q m :
Therefore, provided 0 is not an element of x,Û d (z) allows to recover the error positions without ambiguity. Transposing this result to Patterson decoding requires to adapt both EEA's. The adaptation of the second one is straightforward. For the first one (syndrome inversion), a problem arises: the analogous of Proposition 3would yieldÛ N I (z) = µz ki (S
−1
Gop,e mod g) for some k i > 0, and we found no way of determining when z is a factor of S
Gop,e mod g. However, we can protect the second EEA to avoid the attack of 3.2.
Conclusion
We proposed an algorithm determining the error-locator polynomial costing always 16t
2 field multiplications on any input. It contains a test depending on secret data, followed by two balanced branches. The indistinguishability of those branches by an attacker is crucial for the security of the decryption, and depends on the architecture of the implementation.
Algorithm 10 EEA with regular flow
δ ← δ + 1. 10:
A Proofs of completeness
Proof of Proposition 1. We recall of the R i (z)'s are computed: set R −1 (z) = r −1 (z) = a(z) and R 0 (z) = r 0 (z) = b(z). Then, for 1 i N , set R (0) i−2 (z) = R i−2 (z) and recursively
with
In essence we have to prove that R (δi+1) i−2 (z) is the rest of the Euclidian division of R i−2 (z) by R i−1 (z). First, we prove by induction on j that, for all 1 i N and 0 j δ i + 1, there exists a polynomial f i,j (z) ∈ F q m [z] and a non-zero scalar µ i,j such that
For j = 0, pick f i,0 (z) = 0, µ i,0 = 1 and notice that deg(R
Regarding the degree, if deg(R
, so that the leading monomials cancel, and therefore
Thanks to Eq. (9), we know that at step j = δ i + 1 :
Thanks to the induction hypothesis R i−2 (z) = λ i−2 r i−2 (z) and R i−1 (z) = λ i−1 r i−1 (z), so we have
By unicity in the Euclidean division, we set λ i = λ i−2 µ −1 i,δi+1 it follows that:
For (U 
This is done by induction on j. For j = 0, we haveR 
The following iterations (j > 2w H (e)) consists only in shifts. Indeed, as deg(z d−d N −1 +1 R N (z)) = w H (e) + 1 + deg(ω e (z)) 2w H (e), and after 2t − 2w H (e) up-wise shifts the output still has degree d = 2t.
